America, China & the Truth in Between

How is the World Shaped Today?

The post-2008 international order is fragmenting, giving way to competitive multipolarity.  These are not recent changes, but issues Chris Parry and Rudy Vandaele-Kennedy have been discussing for almost 20 years.

This shift has been gradual.  Confidence in the Western-led rules-based system has weakened, strategic rivalry has returned and power is diffusing.  Some describe the moment as a new Phoney or Cold War.  There are signs of bloc formation – on one side stand China, Russia, Iran and North Korea.  On the other, a looser grouping of liberal democracies led by the United States with Canada, parts of Europe, the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, etc.

Yet the world is not cleanly bipolar.  Major states such as India, Turkey, Brazil and Saudi Arabia hedge rather than align rigidly.  Global supply chains, financial markets and technological systems remain intertwined.  Climate interdependence further limits full decoupling.  What we are witnessing is not a settled Cold War, but sustained strategic competition under conditions of shifting interdependence.

Reordering, Not Collapse

Analogies such as the “Fall of the Roman Empire” or the “Great Collapse of the Bronze Age” may be overstated, but are the seeds there?  The system has not collapsed, but it is shifting at an ever faster pace.  Core institutions endure, the US Dollar remains central and trade continues at scale.  What is fading is Western dominance within the system, not the system itself yet.

The likely outcome is prolonged reordering and fragmentation.  Norms are contested.  Enforcement is inconsistent.  Rising powers are building parallel structures while still operating within existing ones.

Migration and Performance Legitimacy

Sustained mass migration pressures over the past 15–20 years have had significant political, economic and social consequences.  Combined with slower growth and security concerns, they have strengthening demands for stronger border control and national cohesion.

This shift has fuelled a broader rise in muscular nationalism, in which legitimacy is tied to performance – security, economic delivery and state competence.

Contexts differ sharply among democratic leaders where President Zelensky’s is defensive wartime mobilisation, President Milei’s is economic-liberal shock therapy, Prime Minister Netanyahu governs amid internal constitutional conflict and Prime Minister Meloni operates within EU constraints.  Each operates in an environment where supranational governance commands less automatic trust and state cohesion is beginning to carry greater political weight.

Strategic Competition Expands

The “debate” over Greenland illustrates how competition now extends even to the Arctic.  Chinese economic and military interests there triggered heightened American concern about strategic access and infrastructure resilience.  The US National Security Strategy clearly views China as the primary pacing challenge and regions once considered peripheral are now strategically salient.

Washington recognises that the geopolitical environment is hardening.  The question for allies is not whether competition exists, but how to respond to it.

China and the Balance Ahead

China’s leadership prioritises regime survival and social stability while pursuing self-sufficiency through initiatives such as “Made in China 2025.”  Yet it faces demographic decline, slower growth and external economic tensions linked to its large trade surplus.  The Chinese leadership is secretly concerned about its rural population still living in extreme poverty – it fears another “Long March from the Interior,” which is a major reason for its external posturing.

History suggests that economic imbalance and geopolitical rivalry can reinforce one another.  How China balances domestic consolidation with external ambition will significantly shape the emerging order.

Europe in the Middle

If Washington and Beijing form the principal poles of competition, Europe sits between them.  The European Union faces a defining choice – further deepening integration to a “United States of Europe” and to aim to act as a coherent strategic power or remain primarily as an economic bloc.  That decision will influence whether competitive multipolarity stabilises or fragments further.

We are not witnessing collapse, but a turbulent transition.  The period of change will not be smooth.   The unipolar moment has passed.  Interdependence persists, but it is politicised.  Legitimacy is shifting toward performance and security.  The order is being reshaped and how States position themselves now will determine its future character.

May you live in interesting times … is that a proverb or a curse?

VERSION 2

To listen to the full Podcast please e-mail us at hello@kohimapartners.com.  A summary is below, but the Podcast discussion goes much deeper.  Also, do let us know if there’s anything you’d like to discuss.

How is the World shaped today?  The post-2008 international order is fragmenting, giving way to competitive Multipolarity.  These are not recent changes, but issues Chris Parry and Rudy Vandaele-Kennedy have been discussing for almost 20 years.

The current international situation can be described as a being in a Cold War or a Phoney War and it’s important to see that this hasn’t happened in a day, but has been shaping over time.  The international rules-based order is collapsing post-2008, with two blocs forming – Eurasian Autocrats (Russia, China, Iran and North Korea) and a loose “Free World” (US, Canada, parts of Europe, UK, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, etc.).  The world is not cleanly bipolar with countries like India, Turkey, Brazil and Saudi Arabia hedging rather than aligning rigidly.  Global supply chains, technology, finance and climate interdependence also make full bloc separation costly.  If not a bipolar Cold or Phoney War, then we certainly face a competitive Multipolarity.

There has also been significant surge migration over the last 15 to 20 years and this is having a deep impact politically, socially and economically.  Are we seeing seeds of the “Fall of the Roman Empire” or the “Great Collapse of the Bronze Age”?  We are certainly seeing drivers for a transition of power.  The old international rules-based system is fading with some states preserving elements of it and others building modern structures.  It hasn’t collapsed, but reordering and fragmenting is an outcome that we should expect to face.

One of the prime reactions to the fading world order, and consequent instability, is the rise of “muscular nationalism” where legitimacy is tied to state performance, in both totalitarian and democratic contexts.  Democratic country leaders like Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Zelensky, President Milei and Prime Minister Meloni are prioritising state cohesion above a rigid adherence to old norms, but it’s important to recognise their differences as they share drive, but not necessarily the same ideology (President Zelensky’s is defensive wartime mobilisation, President Milei’s is economic-liberal shock therapy, Prime Minister Netanyahu governs amid internal constitutional conflict and Prime Minister Meloni operates within EU constraints).  They see threats like “climate change” and “surge migration” as being ones that individual states must contend with, without expectation of leadership by international structures.  For some, legitimacy is increasingly tied to security, economic performance, border control and national cohesion reflecting declining trust in supranational governance.  A clash of civilisations is becoming increasingly hard to ignore, much as many Western liberals and globalists would seem to like to.  Western civilisation, developed from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, is being challenged by the Islamic world, Chinese civilisation and Russia’s 18^th Century-style revival.

The proposal of having 5,000 Chinese miners, being negotiated with the Greenland government, was the straw that pushed the US Leadership to up the rhetoric about Denmark’s Arctic territory.  The US National Security Strategy is clear that China is a pacing threat to US hegemony, with increasing presence in Africa and the Western Hemisphere.  

This ties with Homeland Security, controlling migration and stopping illegal drugs re-enforcing the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary.  President Trump’s “Art of the Deal” tactics involve high bids to get concessions.  The furore over Greenland boils down to China and Russia seeking an advantage over the US.  This is while current Nordic commitments to Arctic defence are minimal compared to Russia’s capabilities.

The US’s effective security intelligence means they often feel they see things ahead of others, based on what they know their adversaries are thinking, rather than supposition. That gives them an advantage and so there is usually method to what so many think is madness. We should deal with President Trump as he is, not as we want him to be, and understand that he knows that the world is reshaping now.  He wants it shaped to America's advantage.  How should other Western leaders be thinking?

China’s focus on the survival of the Party and social stability are its clear priorities followed by its drive for “Made in China 2025” demonstrating this.  China’s share of world GDP has fallen the last four years and their output has fallen back from three quarters to two thirds of US levels.  These issues are disguised by a record US Dollar 1.2 trillion trade surplus last year and now that surplus has reached an extraordinary 1% of global GDP.

In some ways this harks back to the Opium Wars of the 1840s when China refused to engage in equal commercial reciprocity, exporting but refusing to import, sucking in global silver and acting like a deflationary black hole which precipitated its “century of humiliation.”  China’s response could be to either tighten control (as in the Deng Xiaoping era) or project problems outward, expanding its strategic and political footprint, with a stated goal to “control everything under heaven” by 2049.  The Chinese leadership secretly fears its rural population still living in extreme poverty and fears another “Long March from the Interior,” which is a major reason for its external posturing.

How is the “in between”?  A real test of the reshaping order will not be in Washington or Beijing, but in Europe.  The European Union will face a defining choice.  Does it deepen integration, edging towards a federal “United States of Europe”?  Or does it revert to a looser common market, prioritising economic cooperation over geopolitical cohesion?

May you live in interesting times … is that a proverb or a curse?